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Abstract
A new workflow for software development (proof-driven develop-
ment) is presented. An extension of test-driven development, the new
workflow utilizes the paradigm of dependently typed programming.
The differences in design, complexity and provability of software are
discussed, based on the technique used to create the system. Further-
more, the difference in what properties can be expressed in a proof-
driven development workflow versus a traditional test-driven develop-
ment workflow or using test-last development.
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1 Introduction
Program correctness and software quality poses a serious concern in our lives.
We not only carry computing devices on our person, but in our person. Many
advances have been made recently to the way we construct software, in-
cluding agile methodologies like test-driven development. Our programming
languages have been evolving as well, giving us new paradigms we are only
just learning to leverage. Several of these languages can be used for formal
mathematical proof, and support extremely strong type checking at compile
time.
The earlier a defect is detected, the easier it is to resolve. Finding defects
with a compiler means they are never introduced into a completed build.
We can never fix every defect [1]. Even mathematics cannot save us entirely
from the complexity of the systems we build [2]. However, we can reduce
the number of defects we allow [3]. Frequently, the tools used to reduce
such defect rates are mathematical proofs of correctness [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], and
improvements to the processes used to create software [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16].
This work proposes a merging of these two families of ideas.
1.1 Gaps
When we discuss formally (mathematically) verified software, we find the
workflow (which we refer to as the “common workflow”, below) with the
following stages has been broadly employed by the papers cited here.
1. Define security goals.
2
2. Produce specification or policy.
3. Produce model.
4. Prove the model meets the goals.
5. Implement a system based on the model.
In theory, the “common workflow” should suffice. But, there is a gap
between theory and practice (or “in theory, theory is practice; in practice it’s
not.”1). In particular, a problematic gap exists where a model (about which
proofs exist) is used only as a guide to the implementation. A painful example
of this was the recent Heartbleed bug [17] in an extension to the open source
cryptography library OpenSSL. While the cryptographic base framework was
proven to be sound (at least as far as conjectures surrounding the difficulty of
mathematical problems like integer factorization and the discrete log problem
allow), the implementation was not sound. To produce secure systems more
reliably, we must reduce the number and size of such gaps.
In this paper, we provide the following central contribution:
• We introduce an alternative to the common workflow, which we call
“Proof driven development” (PDD). Proof-driven development repre-
sents an extension to existing test-driven development workflows, com-
bined with new technology made available by proof assistants and de-
pendently typed languages. This contribution is described in section
2.
1.2 Language Selection
As proof-related features are somewhat esoteric in the realm of programming
languages, we can begin our search with tools/systems that self-identify as
proof assistants2. We select our language based on two key characteristics:
• the language’s power as a theorem prover, and;
• the ability to extract executable machine code.
To consider a system a theorem prover for our discussions, we need at
least universal quantification over a predicate (e.g. ∀x, P (x) = true) rather
than simple existential quantification (e.g. ∃x, P (x) = true). Some of the
implications of this broader ability are discussed in section 2.
1Variations of this quote have been attributed to DaVinci, Fermat, Pascal and Einstein.
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof assistant
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Even in systems that support the extraction of runnable code, the ex-
traction process is not always built-in. For example, Coq [18] has the ability
to extract ML or Haskell code which can then be made executable by the
toolchains provided by Haskell and ML. However, the extracted code often
loses many of the useful type-safety properties. Some issues related to ex-
traction are described by Swierstra in his experience report [19] on working
with ML code extracted from Coq.
As some tools do not support either compilation or extraction, these tools
will never be suitable for end-to-end software construction.
We have chosen the language Idris [20] for our demonstration of the new
proof-driven development workflow. However, other dependently typed lan-
guages such as Cayenne [21], Agda [22], or Coq [23] would suffice in terms
of quantification power. In the words of the designer of Idris, it is a “sys-
tems programming language with dependent types” [20], and thus suitable
for practical programming. It can be thought of as a combination of Agda
and Haskell.
By design, Idris features:
“easy interoperability with C and high level language constructs to
support domain specific language implementation. Idris empha-
sises general-purpose programming, rather than theorem proving,
and as such includes higher level programming constructs such as
type classes and ‘do-notation’. Idris also supports tactic based the-
orem proving, and has a lightweight Hugs/GHCI style interface.”
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2 Proof Driven Development
The software development lifecycle (SDLC), for both “normal” software, and
“mission critical” software requiring the utmost security includes: specifica-
tion, design, implementation and testing. However, there are many schools
of thought concerning the “best” way to organize the progress between these
states during the construction of software. In waterfall development (de-
scribed in detail in section 3), the states are not revisited, but progressed
through linearly. In so-called “Agile” processes (see section 4), such as “eX-
treme Programming” (XP) [24], these states are visited repeatedly during the
3Idris FAQ: http://docs.idris-lang.org/en/latest/faq/faq.html
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construction of software, in a spiral pattern. These two schools of thought
about the construction of software tend to apply at different times. Waterfall
is well-suited to problem domains where the issues are well-understood, and
new unknowns are not likely to arise during construction. Agile is better
suited to exploration and research, as it does not make the assumption that
all the facts are in before implementation begins, and permits requirements
to change during the construction process.
This workflow is pictured in figure 4. The numbers for each stage in the
figure refer to the artifacts, showing clearly the flow from specifications to
mental model to mathematical model to source code. The source code is
then compiled into the program, and finally the proofs are written.
Here, we make an argument for a mixed approach to secure software con-
struction, as there are important lessons to be learned from both approaches.
3 Waterfall
Waterfall assumes that all design decisions can be made before the soft-
ware/system is constructed. This tends to apply in well-understood areas.
Waterfall grew out of very early attempts to formalize software construction
processes [25]. These early approaches were based on electrical and hard-
ware engineering techniques. The authors admitted that it was not an ideal
approach due to the differences between these engineering disciplines (being
well understood) and the mathematically/algorithmically oriented software
engineering discipline which was only just emerging.
Many Agile adherents [11, 14, 16, 24] argue that waterfall is costly and
unrealistic. However, pre-loading the design and specification phases is very
much what tends to happen with secure software systems, especially con-
sidering the academic sources of many designs/specifications. Many of the
specifications/systems have been proven on paper and published without the
original authors intending to implement the systems themselves. This allows
for a great deal of caution and review from many experts. Indeed, the most
common workflow (described in section 1.1 and figure 4) is based on this
idea.
However, the criticisms of waterfall in terms of emerging issues, and the
speed with which the final system is available are valid, and it is clear that
the waterfall approach by itself is not sufficient.
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4 Agile/TDD
Agile itself is a blanket term for many software development processes in-
cluding Clean Room [15] – which incorporates the use of formal methods
such as model checking, process algebras, and testing, XP [24], and SCRUM
[16]. The core values of Agile systems are embodied by their manifesto:
We are uncovering better ways of developing software by doing
it and helping others do it. Through this work we have come to
value:
• Individuals and interactions over processes and tools
• Working software over comprehensive documentation
• Customer collaboration over contract negotiation
• Responding to change over following a plan
That is, while there is value in the items on the right, we value
the items on the left more. 4
Clearly, there is a large variety of so-called Agile methods, and they all
vary from one to the next. However, one key discipline, notable in a great deal
of these methods, is called “test-driven development” or TDD. Test-driven
development was described in great detail by Kent Beck in his introductory
guide to TDD [10], and it is described in a great deal of related texts [13, 14,
3, 11, 16].
Test-driven development refers to the reversal of the “common” workflow
for creating software. Instead of writing a piece of software, and then writing
a test to determine if the software is working correctly, the test is created
first to “drive” the creation of the software required to satisfy the assertions
in the test. This is important for several reasons, described in detail by Beck
and Martin in their works on software craftsmanship[24, 10, 14]. First, bud-
get and timeline pressure often forces things on the end of the spectrum to
be dropped (that is: the tests never get written). Second, the tests “driv-
ing” (or “pulling”, in Toyota Production [26] or Lean [27] terminology) the
functionality help to keep the system minimal (“lean”), with no unnecessary
functions. Third, the creation of tests up-front force the developers to think
of the users of the code (be it other systems or end-users). Finally, the tests
4http://agilemanifesto.org/
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form a suite of properties that can be automatically verified, thus helping to
avoid regression errors (re-introducing bugs that were previously fixed into
new releases).
While TDD has gained substantial traction in recent years, with dozens
of publications extolling its virtues, the idea is not new. Anecdotally5, the
Mercury Space Program at NASA used a variant of TDD with their punch-
card programming system: punching the cards with the expected output,
then programming the system until the output punchcards matched. What
has changed recently is the availability and quality of tools built to support
this new workflow. Many frameworks are based on early work by Beck [10],
who created the first “xUnit” unit testing framework, SUnit for Smalltalk.
SUnit (and Smalltalk itself) did not gain a huge marketshare (below 0.21%
according to TIOBE 6). However, JUnit (a Java version SUnit) saw a great
deal of success - with many books discussing it, including Beck’s and Mar-
tin’s well known volumes on practical software construction [10, 14]. These
frameworks made TDD approachable to industry, and promoted the “red-
green-refactor” workflow of creating a failing test case (red), making the test
case pass by creating the simplest code possible (green), then refactoring the
code to make it clean [13]. The workflow has had a remarkable effect on de-
fect rates, with a study at IBM showing a 50% reduction over ad-hoc testing
[3].
Testing and test coverage (the proportion of code-paths covered by tests)
are influenced by the source language, and the complexity [28] of the meth-
ods/classes under test. The limiting factor is that fundamentally all tests are
fixed-point assertions. That is, for a function f , we can specify the output
for any fixed input y = f(x). We can do this for arbitrarily many values of
x, but it is still finite instances of existential quantification (that there is an
x for which this function behaves correctly). Extending this idea with sta-
tistical sampling, we arrive at the work of Claessen and Hughes, QuickCheck
[29]. Their work is based on the idea that any value from a range of in-
puts should produce valid output within another well-defined range (and not
crash). The system uses these ranges as inputs and statistically samples val-
ues within them (the number of which is configurable) and synthesizes new
assertions/test cases. This is analogous to how a human would extend the
same tests, but without the tedium of creating them manually.
5http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?TenYearsOfTestDrivenDevelopment
6http://www.tiobe.com/index.php/content/paperinfo/tpci/index.html
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Even with such statistical sampling, we cannot say the function is correct
for any input. In formal terms we cannot state “∀x, f(x) is valid.” Section
4.1 shows why this is still a source of defects.
4.1 Example Existential Problems
To illustrate why testing based on “arbitrarily many” existential inputs is
not sufficient to cover all error cases that a universally quantified assertion
would cover, we present the following example. In mathematical terms, we
define a relation f(x) = x/x where the inputs and outputs of f are the Real
numbers. In code, this could be implemented as shown in figure 1.
double f(double x) {
return x/x;
}
Figure 1: C program with bug.
Plotting this function, we would see the graph in figure 2.
Figure 2: Graph with hole.
For arbitrarily many values this method gives the correct and expected
return value, 1. However, for the input 0, this program causes a division by
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zero error. So, not only does one value (just one, out of as many distinct val-
ues as the data type supports) give an unexpected result, this input actually
crashes the program. While this is a contrived example, the issue exposed
here is very real.
It is not only numerical issues that can cause unexpected bugs during
translation from symbolic mathematics into computational datatypes and
functions. Other datatypes suffer from related problems. Take for example
the Java method in figure 3.
String convertBoolean(Boolean b) {
return b.toString();
}
Figure 3: Java program with bug.
It would seem that by testing the function with the values true and false,
we would exhaustively test this function. However, the Boolean data type
in Java is actually tri-state. It is possible to crash this program by passing
null, a Boolean (distinct from the primitive boolean data type) value that
is neither true nor false. To be truly confident in our reasoning about the
behavior of functions we need to be able to assert behavior for all possible
values of our data types.
5 PDD
In order to close gaps in the common workflow described in section 1.1, as
shown in figure 4, we extend the notion of test driven development and Clean
Room software engineering with what we dub “proof-driven development”,
PDD. The term has been used before by Bird to describe a similar technique
used to iteratively refine an algorithm to solve Sudoku puzzles [30]. However,
the proofs described therein are not machine verified (essentially Bird is talk-
ing more about proof-backed refactoring). Using proof-driven development
techniques without automation leaves the system (and proofs) vulnerable to
regression errors. Regression errors are a common problem in areas that
require change or evolution (as with nearly all software systems).
Using the power of dependent types in a proof assistant language (for
our purposes, Idris), we are able to perform specifications with universal
9
Figure 4: Common workflow (numbered).
quantification. Furthermore, by selecting a language with support for extrac-
tion/compilation, we close an entire problematic gap in the common workflow
diagram (figure 4). The improved workflow is shown in figure 5. The first
two steps, creating specifications and synthesizing a mental model, remain
the same as in the common workflow. However, the next step is to create
proof statements of desired properties. These proofs (and the output from
the compiler/verifier) guide the creation of the mathematical model. The
mathematical model takes the place of the extracted/derived source code,
and the compiler directly produces a program.
As with TDD, success will depend on the quality of the framework and
language upon which the system is based. When we make a proof-based,
universally quantified assertion, such as “∀x, f(x) does not crash”, we need
our system to tell us if in fact we have changed f such that it is not longer
true. Ideally during development, the system will guide us/the user to the
“correct” data types to complete the proof of correctness.
Systems like Agda and Idris that support “holes”, where the compiler can
tell what type of computation is needed to get from state A to state B, are
close. Similarly, systems with proof search such as Coq, Agda, and Idris, can
10
Figure 5: Improved workflow (numbered).
make use of the compiler information about the hole in the proof.
To illustrate this, consider the line of reasoning about transitivity of ho-
momorphisms in Idris in figure 6. This is a statement and partial proof of
transitivity of semigroup homomorphisms (details and full sources online7).
It states that two homomorphisms h and h′ can be evaluated in either order.
The proof steps are elided by the holes “?prf1” and “?prf2”. The system
can be queried as to the exact type required for each hole (which in this
case is a complex expression due to the dictionary tracking, necessary for
distinguishing which semigroup operation is being referenced).
This signature can then be passed to the proof search engine. For ex-
ample, if we needed a transformation from Nat (the type denoting natural
numbers in Idris) to Bool (the type denoting boolean values in Idris), we
could search as shown in figure 7. The results of which show us that the
system knows two such predicates, isSucc (a decision property to determine
7http://github.com/bgoodspeed/idris-misc
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if a given natural number is a successor form (greater than zero), and isZero,
which matches if the natural number is zero.
homTrans : (adict : Semigroup a, bdict : Semigroup b,
cdict : Semigroup c) =>
Hom a b adict bdict -> Hom b c bdict cdict
-> Hom a c adict cdict
homTrans @{adict} @{bdict} @{cdict} (MkHom h preservesGroup)
(MkHom h’ preservesGroup’) =
MkHom @{adict} @{cdict} (\x => h’ (h x))
(\something, another =>
(h’ (h (something <+> another))) ={ ?prf1 }=
(h’ (h something <+> h another)) ={ ?prf2 }=
(h’ (h something) <+> h’ (h another)) QED)
Figure 6: Idris equational reasoning.
> :search Nat -> Bool
= Prelude.Nat.isSucc : Nat -> Bool
= Prelude.Nat.isZero : Nat -> Bool
Figure 7: Idris proof search.
These two features, together with broader type libraries, utility lemmas
and improved error reporting should go a long to way to making PDD a
viable secure software construction method.
5.1 Design By Contract
Meyer, in his pioneering work on Design By Contract (DBC) [31], was one
of the first to realize this logical extension of Hoare logic (preconditions,
invariants and postconditions). Proof driven development extends this idea
further. The limitations of the language’s type system define the limits of the
assertions that can be made within the contracts. These limitations include
being limited to existential assertions, and the capabilities of statically typed
systems with weaker foundations than dependent types. If previous systems
like Java, C#, C++, C, Python, Haskell, etc. supported dependent types,
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design by contact frameworks would be capable of encoding very nearly the
same types of assertions (both existentially and universally quantified).
This class of limitations applies regardless of the “level” at which the pred-
icate is tested. Specifically, in DBC, three levels are available: preconditions,
postconditions and (loop-)invariants. At each level the same limitations of
what properties can be asserted exist. For example: Java types cannot define
functional types, so a method cannot take another method as an argument;
also, Haskell’s type system (including algebraic data types) can only param-
eterize based on existing top-level types (the full details of this are available
in Weirich’s work on dependent type systems [32]).
6 Examples
In this section, we show examples of the issues that arise following a “com-
mon” approach. We illustrate the changes to design and how we can utilize
the compiler and error messages in a “PDD” approach.
The challenges that arise from a standard approach are discussed in sec-
tion 6.1. The alternative approach based on PDD is discussed in section 6.2.
In order to provide a valid comparison, we will show issues with creating
a function to parse characters into integers. For example, the character ’1’
represents the integer 1, and should successfully parse. On the other hand,
the character ’N’ does not represent a valid integer and should not parse.
6.1 Common Approach
In this section we will work through the creation of a function and associated
proof in the “common” workflow.
In Idris, the notion of parsing a character that may or may not be valid
can be captured with the definition in figure 8. We look for the 10 valid cases,
and return Nothing if it does not match any of them. (Clearly this code can
be improved, but for illustration purposes it is clear that it is correct).
We would like to prove, then, that any character not between ’0’ and ’9’
yields Nothing. Suppose we have a function “isNumeric” which takes a Char
and returns a Boolean (indicating whether the character is between ’0’ and
’9’). Then, we can define the statement of such a proof as shown in figure 9.
When we attempt to prove the statement, the problem becomes in-
tractable (figure 10). This is because there is nothing to connect the im-
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parseInteger : Char -> Maybe Int
parseInteger ’0’ = Just 0
parseInteger ’1’ = Just 1
parseInteger ’2’ = Just 2
parseInteger ’3’ = Just 3
parseInteger ’4’ = Just 4
parseInteger ’5’ = Just 5
parseInteger ’6’ = Just 6
parseInteger ’7’ = Just 7
parseInteger ’8’ = Just 8
parseInteger ’9’ = Just 9
parseInteger _ = Nothing
Figure 8: Idris type declaration for parsing integers.
invalidCharAlwaysNothing : (c : Char) -> (pf : isNumeric c = False)
-> parseInteger c = Nothing
invalidCharAlwaysNothing c pf = ?invalidCharAlwaysNothing_rhs
Figure 9: Idris proof statement.
plementation of “parseInteger” to the stipulated portion of the proof, specif-
ically that the character is numeric. To move forward, we must examine
the definition of our parse function, and change it to use our numeric query
function, or similarly sever the conditional logic. This happens after 10 lines
of very obvious implementation code. The problem grows with larger code
segments.
As an example of a larger code segment, during string concatention, if we
allow for “negative characters” (such that ’a’ concatenated with its negative
would yield the empty string) proving even a simple property such as that a
string concatenated with the empty string becomes extremely involved. The
proof state corresponding to this is shown in figure 11. (The full details of
such string manipulation are available online8).
8https://github.com/bgoodspeed/idris-strings
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parse> :p invalidCharAlwaysNothing_rhs
---------- Assumptions: ----------
c : Char
pf : isNumeric c = False
---------- Goal: ----------
{hole3} : parseInteger c = Nothing
Figure 10: Idris proof status.
---------- Assumptions: ----------
c : SignedChar
w : Word
inductiveHypothesis : wordConcatAndCollapse w Empty = w
---------- Goal: ----------
{hole3} : case block in
wordCollapse (c # wordConcat w Empty)
(wordCollapseOneLevel (c # wordConcat w Empty))
(Words.Word instance of Prelude.Classes.Eq,
method == (c # wordConcat w Empty)
(wordCollapseOneLevel
(c # wordConcat w Empty))) = c # w
Figure 11: Idris complex proof status.
6.2 PDD Approach
As shown in figure 9, if we approach the same problem with a proof state-
ment first but before creating the code, the necessary connection between
the qualifier (isNumeric) and the implementation is more obvious. In fact,
we can now encode the relationship directly into the datatype (figure 12).
This means we can declare the signature of our “parseInteger” function
using the new datatype (figure 13). Using this, we realize that we cannot
even construct a call to “parseInteger” using a non-numeric character. The
compiler refuses to unify “False = True” (figure 14). This means we can
remove the possibility of failure from the method signature, removing the
Maybe clause (figure 15).
This small change in workflow for a trivial function has many improve-
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data NumChar : Type where
MkNumChar : (c : Char) -> (ok: isNumeric c = True) -> NumChar
Figure 12: Idris data type declaration.
parseInteger : NumChar -> Maybe Int
Figure 13: Idris improved parseInteger declaration (A).
ments to the resulting design. This is true not only to the design of the
code developed here, but also for any client code making use of the function.
Rather than using a parse routine and checking afterwards to see if some-
thing went wrong, it is now up to the client to prove nothing will go wrong
before it is allowed to make the call.
7 Impacts
As discussed in the previous section, the use of PDD extends TDD (there are
assertions that can be made in a proof-driven environment that cannot be
made in a test-driven environment) and permits universal quantification of
system properties. The use of proof assistants in general close an important
security gap, as shown in figures 4 and 5.
Just as TDD was shown to alter the structure of the code under test/development
(by making hooks for tests to assert intermediate results), so too does PDD.
In this case, we have intermediate placeholders for assertions, as well as in-
termediate dependent data types (which carry their properties with them,
similar to invariants in Hoare logic [33]).
It is possible for a proof script itself to contain errors, thus “locking
in” erroneous behavior in the system. Of course, this is true of ink and
paper proofs as well. The traditional remedy for such paper proofs is peer
review. The corresponding software quality technique is code review, which
has been shown to positively impact quality [34]. This is sometimes done
during development, as in pair programming used by the XP [24] process,
and sometimes after the system is completed. The benefits arising from code
reviews happening after construction is that the system is viewed by someone
16
parse> parseInteger (MkNumChar ’c’ Refl)
(input):1:25:When elaborating argument ok
to constructor Main.MkNumChar:
Can’t unify
x = x
with
isNumeric ’c’ = True
Specifically:
Can’t unify
False
with
True
Figure 14: Idris compilation error for bad invocation.
parseInteger : NumChar -> Int
Figure 15: Idris improved parseInteger declaration (B).
not involved in its creation. This has had a substantial impact on the quality
of systems as a whole [34, 35].
It should be noted that this is not a ‘silver bullet’ [36]. It should be
easier to prove properties about code created with proofs first than trying
to prove properties post-hoc. The extreme cost and difficulties associated
with machine verified proofs are is also worth noting. In one successful
system, the seL4 verified microkernel (a formally verified operating system
kernel) [5], development was completed in approximately 2 person-months,
but verification efforts took 20 person-years [37]. Substantial work is required
to make verified software construction easier for industrial users as well as
expert academics before it can become mainstream.
8 Related Work
We saw the formalization of the processes used to create software in the late
1990s and early 2000s [11, 10, 16, 24].
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Quality assurance, for our purposes, is the act of verifying that an imple-
mented system (per the workflow described in section 1.1) meets the goals
or policies defined by the specification phase.
This is often done by testing. Fundamentally, there is a divide between
manual testing (where a person operates the machine/runs the program) and
automated testing (where the machine consults an oracle [38] to determine
the correct results). Formally, procedures (such as ISO 9000 [39], clean room
[15], and waterfall [25]) have been used to facilitate manual testing and apply
rigor to a human endeavor. Semi-recently, agile software development [14,
11, 16, 24] has pushed for new processes like test-driven development (TDD)
[10] to shift more of the work onto the computer. This has had a positive
effect on defect rates, in some cases reducing the number of defects by 50%
[3].
The theoretical framework of a programming language defines the limits
of what can be described by the primitives of the language. In the earliest
languages (assembly languages), the framework was dictated by the logic
gate structures of the hardware on which they ran [40]. Early higher level
languages (ones that require translation or compilation to run as machine
code), such as LISP and Fortran, were based on very early formalisms of
the lambda calculus[41] and Turing machines [42]. More recent advances in
programming language theory and type theory gave rise to systems like the
calculus of inductive constructions [43], which allowed us to build systems like
Coq [23] and Isabelle [44]. Martin-Lof type theory [45] gave rise to dependent
types [7, 46, 47], which form the basis of the systems Agda [22], Idris [20]
and Cayenne [21].
9 Conclusion
We demonstrated that our new workflow, PDD, can express universal quan-
tification. This is broader in scope than existential quantification as used in
TDD, which itself had desirable properties in the SDLC. We analysed the
available dependently typed systems, and justified our choice of Idris for this
research. We have used the lessons of other recent developments with related
languages and for related goals to avoid re-inventing the wheel.
While several steps have been taken, some important issues of difficulty
and utility of these systems remain to be solved before widespread industrial
use is likely. We discuss several avenues of future work below in the hopes
18
that some of these can be addressed in the future.
10 Future Work
Dependently typed programming is a young discipline, and the paradigm is
not yet well understood. The implications of design decisions are not clear,
nor are best practices. Much experimentation will be required before we can
tell the long term ramifications of our type designs.
10.1 Error Messages
As with TDD, the quality of error messages determines the utility of the
workflow - if we want the process to guide us towards correct code, we need
to know where we’ve gone off the rails. With the availability of proof search,
and the compiler ability to query for the type required to fill a hole in a
program, it should be possible to generate suggestions within the system
library as to: a) the exact signature required of a method to complete the
program; and, b) known methods that have the required signature. A more
flexible search that can consider composite expressions or interim datatypes
would be useful.
When proofs fail to unify (as when assertions fail to pass), it would be
extremely helpful to have a return value saying why and exactly where it
failed.
In particular, Idris does not inform the user during interactive proofs
that a rewrite has failed. The compiler silently fails to change the target
expression.
10.2 Proof Targeting
It would be useful to support pre-order reasoning (as in equational reasoning
in mathematical proof), so that intermediate transformations can happen.
This would more closely mimic the way mathematics are done without com-
puter assistance, and would therefore be a more familiar and gentler intro-
duction to mathematical verification.
19
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